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WHAT, PRECISELY, IS CARTER'S DOOMSDAY ARGUMENT?
Abstract. Paying strict attention to Brandon Carter's several published ren-
ditions of anthropic reasoning, we present a \nutshell" version of the Doomsday
argument that is truer to Carter's principles than the standard balls-and-urns
or otherwise \naive Bayesian" versions that proliferate in the literature. At
modest cost in terms of complication, the argument avoids commitment to
many of the half-truths that have inspired so many to rise up against other
toy versions, never adopting posterior outside of the convex hull of one's prior
distribution over the \true chance" of Doom. The hyper-pessimistic position
of the standard balls-and-urn presentation and the hyper-optimistic position
of naive self-indicators are seen to arise from dubiously extreme prior distribu-
tions, leaving room for a more satisfying and plausible intermediate solution.
1. Introduction
Anthropic reasoning principles leading eventually to one version of the so-called
Doomsday Argument (see also Gott 1993, Nielson 1989) arose in the seventies in
two papers by theoretical physicists (Collins and Hawking 1973, Carter 1974).
Brandon Carter in particular is often credited as the most important early propo-
nent of this sort of reasoning in general and the Doomsday argument in particular.
Leslie (1989, 1992, 1996), \working only from rumours about how Carter was run-
ning it", proposed a balls-and-urn version of the Doomsday argument. Bostrom
(1999, 2001) presents similar \nutshell" cases. The following is representative:
Doomsday: Assume two equally likely scenarios: humanity will suer extinction
sooner (Quick Doom), in which case there will be a total of 200 billion humans,
or humanity will suer extinction later (Later Doom), in which case there will
be a total of 200 trillion humans. You learn rst that you are a member of this
indeterminately sized population. At this point your credence in Quick Doom is
1
2
. Next, you learn that you are among the rst 200 billion humans. That fact,
conditional on Quick Doom, has probability one. Conditional on Later Doom,
it has probability 1
1000
. Therefore, you ought to update your credence in Quick
Doom to 1000
1001
by, e.g., Bayes' Theorem:
P (QjE) = P (Q)P (EjQ)
P (Q)P (EjQ) + P (L)P (EjL) =
1
2
 1
1
2
 1 + 1
2
 1
1000
=
1000
1001
:
(Here Q = Quick Doom, L = Later Doom and E = Early Birth Rank.)
Proceeding from the assumption that this is his argument, it would be very easy
to get the impression (as many have) that Carter is badly mistaken. One might
reach this conclusion, for example, by considering an augmentation in which for
each \civilization" in an innite cosmos, a fair coin is tossed once the population
reaches 200 billion. If heads, the civilization is destroyed. If tails, the civilization is
destroyed when the population reaches 200 trillion. The mistake in Doomsday,
1
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one then reasons, is that at the point where you have learned you are human, but
have yet to learn your birth rank, your credence in Later Doom should be exactly
one thousand times greater than your credence in Quick Doom, for the reason
that (in any large enough region) one expects that one thousand times fewer of
your epistemic counterparts' civilizations suer early extinction than do not.1
But Doomsday is an oversimplication{an extreme case of what Carter (1983)
actually describes.2 I don't claim that Leslie and Bostrom are confused on
this point; each makes numerous qualications and oers scenarios in which the
Bayesian calculation ofDoomsday is taken not to apply. Neither, however, oers
an argument that is both general enough to avoid the need for qualication and
formal enough to satisfy skeptics who insist that the favoring of Quick Doom be
rendered in some sort of \rigorous calculation".3 Our purpose here is to show
what such a calculation looks like. This will expose, in particular, that Carter
wasn't wrong at all{not, at least, for any of the reasons these skeptics have oered.
2. Carter's anthropic principle
Carter (1983) contains a concise formulation of the anthropic principle:
\In a typical application of the anthropic (self-selection) principle, one is
engaged in a scientic discrimination process of the usual kind in which one
wishes to compare the plausibility of a set of alternative hypotheses, H(Ti),
say, to the eect that respectively one or other of a corresponding set of
theories T1; T2; : : : is valid for some particular application in the light of
some observational or experimental evidence E, say. Such a situation can
be analysed in a traditional Bayesian framework by attributing a priori
and a posteriori plausibility values (i.e. formal probability measures),
denoted by pE and pS, say, to each hypothesis respectively before and
after the evidence E is taken into account, so that for any particular
result X one has
pE(X) = pS(XjE);
the standard symbol j indicating conditionality. According to the usual
Bayesian formula, the relative plausibility of two theories A and B, say, is
modied by a factor equal to the ratio of the corresponding conditional a
priori probabilities pS(EjA) and pS(EjB) for the occurrence of the result
E in the theories, i.e.
(1)
pE(A)
pE(B)
=
pS(EjA)
pS(EjB)
pS(A)
pS(B)
:"
1Such \self indication" or \double shift" reasoning is employed by Dieks (1992), Bartha and
Hitchcock (1999) and others in direct response toDoomsday, and appears to be closely aligned
with the majority thirder response to the so-called \Sleeping Beauty" problem. Bostrom's (1999)
thought-experiment (the Presumptuous Philosopher) cautions against its too-liberal application,
and is the most eective apologetic for Carter's methods I know of.
2By analogy with other cases of anthropic reasoning; he didn't publish on Doomsday per se.
3Leslie (1996) has on this point suggested that there isn't need of a formal mathematical
presentation, but decades of entrenchment and thousands of pages of spilt ink suggest otherwise.
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Carter stresses that the \Selected" or \Subjective" probability function pS in (1) is
related to an \Original" or \Objective" probability function pO by pS() = pO(jS),
\where S denotes the totality of all the selection conditions that are implied by the
hypothesis of application of the theory to a concrete experimental or observational
situation, but which are not necessarily included in the abstract theory" on which
pO is based. In all three of the examples discussed in Carter (1983), one has
pS(EjA)
pS(EjB) 6=
pO(EjA)
pO(EjB) ;
indeed, this is the hallmark of anthropic reasoning as Carter understands it.
It's worth examining Carter's explanation for this in the rst of these examples,
which he takes to be \the classic example of an argument based on the anthropic
principle". Here A is the hypothesis to the eect that the development of life is
of common occurrence on `habitable' planets, B is the hypothesis that life is very
rare, even in favorable conditions, and E is the evidence consisting of the fact
that on the only obviously `habitable' planet we have yet been able to observe,
namely our own, life does indeed exist.
\If future astronomical progress should one day enable us to observe a sec-
ond example of occurrence of life on a randomly chosen `habitable planet'
belonging to a not too distant star in our Galaxy, the corresponding ab
initio probability ratio, pO(EjA)
pO(EjB) >> 1, would justify the induction that hy-
pothesis A (that life is common) was the most likely. However, so long as
the only example at our disposal is our own, no such inference is permissi-
ble, since the anthropic selection principle ensures, as a virtual tautology,.
that one of the a priori conditions, S, that must be satised by the rst
planet available for investigation by us must be the prior occurrence of
life, namely our own. Thus as in the previous example we obtain not
only pS(EjA) = 1 but also pS(EjB) = 1, so that our observation has no
discriminating power at all, and both...A and B remain equally viable."
In a second example B is the hypothesis to the eect that gravitational coupling
strength is xed across time, while the evidence E is that of a seemingly fortu-
itous mathematical relationship between the Hubble time and the gravitational
coupling constant. (Hypothesis A is that coupling strength increases across time
to preserve this relationship.) According to Carter, in this case pO(EjB) << 1
since the relationship can hold only in one particular epoch under the hypothesis
that the coupling strength doesn't vary, but pS(EjB)  pS(EjA) = 1 since \bi-
ological systems based on the same principles as our own" won't exist in times
where the relationship doesn't hold. That is, the anthropic selection principle
ensures that the seemingly fortuitous relationship between Hubble time and the
gravitational coupling constant must be observed. As in the rst example, then,
hypothesis A is not conrmed by the observation.
In the third and nal example, A is the hypothesis to the eect that the expected
average time t intrisically most likely for the evolution of a system of observers
intelligent enough to comprise a scientic civilization such as our own is geomet-
rically small relative to the main sequence lifetime fi of a typical star, during
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which the energy output can maintain favorable conditions for life; hypothesis B
is that t is geometrically large relative to fi . Now E is the evidence that the time
te  4 billion years necessary for the evolution of intelligent life on Earth is on the
same order of magnitude (i.e. geometrically comparable) as the estimated main
sequence lifetime fi0  10 billion years of the Sun. In this case, Carter would have
us accept that p0(EjA) and p0(EjB) are both very small (and plausibly near each
other). On the other hand pS(EjB)  1 (so that in particular B is conrmed at
the expense of A by the observations), as Carter explains in this passage:
\...the observation that te is comparable with the upper limit fi0 is just
what would be expected if we adopt the alternative hypothesis that the
intrinsically expected time t is much longer than fi0: in this case self-
selection ensures that ours must be one of the exceptional cases in which
evolution has proceeded much faster than usual; (...) there is no particular
reason why we should belong to the even more exceptional cases in which
evolution proceeds even more rapidly although, with the assumption that
the Universe is innite, such cases must of course exist."
Note two features common to these examples.
First, in all of these cases pS(EjA)
pS(EjB) <
pO(EjA)
pO(EjB) ; because observations must occur
from the rst person perspectives of life forms in some respects similar to us, they
are systematically predisposed to favor, conditional on B, positions, situation or
scenarios consistent with E{despite the fact that positions, situations or scenarios
consistent with E might be comparatively rare conditional on B. (For A as well,
perhaps, but relatively more dramatically for B.) For this reason one should not,
despite this comparative rarity, discredit B on the basis of an observation of E.
After all, that the rst observation made would be consistent with E is exactly
what one should expect conditional on B, regardless of what vast volumes of
spacetime one might have to scour in order to locate such an observation.
Second, the ratio pS(A)
pS(B)
is assumed to be equal to pO(A)
pO(B)
. That is to say, the concrete
\selection conditions" aren't taken to favor the hypothesis A over the hypothesis
B on the basis that \more" (in the sense of density if not actual numbers, in the
apparently default case that the Universe is assumed innite conditional on either
hypothesis) observers are predicted conditional on A than on B. Here is where it
is essential that A and B are \theories", i.e. families of probability laws on the
set of complete Universe trajectories. Note that if, to the contrary, A and B were
chance events or ineliminably indexical assertions (heads and tails or Quick Doom
and Later Doom, for example), this assumption would run counter to frequentist
views of credence.4 As it stands, the assumption is consistent with the majority
4Compare Sleeping Beauty or the objections to Doomsday in Section 1 related to sequences
of civilization in an innite cosmos. Note however that Bostrom (1999) and possibly Leslie
believe that whether such frequentist reasoning is appropriate in Doomsday is sensitive to the
actual presence of said \outsiders", i.e. other civilizations. Since Carter seems unconcerned that
the innitude of the Universe might aect his analyses, I have assumed that he would regard
this issue as a red herring, and be sympathetic to the \theory" distinction alone. Compare also
Antony Lewis's SIA-C (Lewis 2001), which applies \within dierent probabilistic outcomes of
a correct theory", does not favor \wrong theories with a larger number of observers" (i.e. isn't
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response (no skewing of prior credences in favor of theories associated with greater
expected population) to Bostrom's \Presumptuous Philosopher" experiment.5
3. An adequate formalization of Carter's Doomsday argument
Before proceeding to Carter's version of the Doomsday argument, I shall give a
brief example showing how (1) is to be used. Consider a coin whose behavior is
known to be correctly described by one of two theories. The rst theory is \the
probability that this coin lands heads on any particular toss is 1
2
, independently of
how it lands on other tosses" (call this theory T1=2). The second is \the probability
that this coin lands heads on any particular toss is 1
3
, independently of how it lands
on other tosses" (call this theory T1=3). Say that, initially, we are indierent as
to which theory is true. That is, pS(T1=2) =
1
2
= pS(T1=3).
Suppose next that we observe E, i.e. that the coin presently lands heads when
tossed. By (1), we have:
pE(T1=2)
pE(T1=3)
=
pS(EjT1=2)
pS(EjT1=3)
pS(T1=2)
pS(T1=3)
=
(1=2)
(1=3)
(1=2)
(1=2)
=
3
2
:
Then our posterior credences in the two theories under consideration are pE(T1=2) =
3
5
and pE(T1=3) =
2
5
, respectively.
Note that, by virtue of aecting one's credences in rival theories, the present
observation of a chance event (such as heads) may aect one's credence in another
chance event. To return to our example (where E is the event that a present toss
lands heads), let F be the event that a subsequent toss will land heads. Then
pS(F ) = pS(T1=2)pS(F jT1=2) + pS(T1=3)pS(F jT1=3) = 1
2
 1
2
+
1
2
 1
3
=
5
12
;
whereas
pE(F ) = pE(T1=2)pE(F jT1=2) + pE(T1=3)pE(F jT1=3) = 3
5
 1
2
+
2
5
 1
3
=
13
30
:
We are now ready to proceed. In the following, I shall restrict application of
(1) to the only sort of hypotheses implicitly sanctioned by Carter's own practice:
hypotheses to the eect that one or another competing theory is true. In order to
avoid straying too far away from the format of Doomsday (which might compli-
cate comparison), I shall carry over the assumption that for human-like species
there are only two equally (from an \outside" perspective) likely possibilities:
Quick Doom (population 200 billion) and Later Doom (population 200 trillion).
\Presumptuous") and agrees with \the frequentist probability" if you \make many universes"{
e.g. countably iterate a nite Universe under a single theory.
5I would urge more entrenched proponents of rival anthropic practices to grant some leeway
here...perhaps view the whole paper as more descriptive than normative. (Though I do happen to
believe that Carter is right, there's a reason I didn't entitle the paper \Why Carter's Doomsday
Argument is Right".) I'm mainly trying to make it clear, by looking at a succession of examples,
that Carter only employs (1) in cases where A and B are competing theories (as I've dened this
notion); in particular, in cases in which one has no actual or nomologically possible counterparts
for whomA andB have dierent truth values than they actually have. I don't claim to be making
any advance on the \Presumptuous Philosopher" intuitions that this practice is \correct".
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The theories grounding the competing hypotheses for consideration in (1) that
I shall consider are given by fTx : x 2 [0; 1]g, where Tx is the assertion that
the expected (and almost sure, should the Universe be innite) density6 of Quick
Doom in human-like species, conditional on the actual complete theory, is x. Of
course for a unique xa 2 [0; 1], Txa is the \correct" theory. Since the agent judges
Quick Doom and Later Doom to be equally likely for any given human-like species,
the expectation of xa (from an \outside" perspective) is
1
2
. On the other hand one
should allow for the agent's distribution for xa to be potentially continuous and
quite diuse, for one cannot necessarily anticipate the extent to which the agent
will be able to discredit, from rst principles, potential (regions of) values for xa.
Denote the probability density function for this distribution by g : [0; 1]! [0;1).
Now according to (1), upon observation of E = my birth rank is at most 200
billion, one ought to multiply the density function g by a factor proportional7 to
pS(EjTx) = 200; 000; 000; 000x+ 200; 000; 000; 000(1  x)
200; 000; 000; 000x+ 200; 000; 000; 000; 000(1  x) =
1
1000  999x:
That is to say, the agent's posterior density function for xa will be
h(x) =
kg(x)
1000  999x; where k =
Z 1
0
g(x)
1000  999x dx
 1
:
Posterior credence in Quick Doom is now just posterior expectation of xa, i.e.
pE(D1) =
Z 1
0
xh(x) dx:
Examples:8
1. Let g(x) = 6x(1  x). Then h(x)  6x(1 x)
:0029674(1000 999x) and
pE(D1) =
Z 1
0
xh(x) dx 
Z 1
0
6x2(1  x)
:0029674(1000  999x) dx  :663683:
2. Let g(x) = 1, i.e. the uniform prior. Then h(x) = 999
ln(1000)(1000 999x) and
pE(D1) =
Z 1
0
xh(x) dx =
Z 1
0
999x
ln(1000)(1000  999x) dx  :856236:
6For those who might be squeamish about densities, substitute \ideal subjective probability
of" (still conditional on the actual complete theory).
7A referee: \Perhaps you're just using Bayes Theorem here, not (1)." It's (1). Note in
particular that h(x)
h(y) = lim!0
pE(T[x;x+))
pE(T[y;y+))
= lim!0
pS(EjT[x;x+))
pS(EjT[y;y+))
pS(T[x;x+))
pS(T[y;y+))
= g(x)
g(y)
pS(EjTx)
pS(EjTy)
a.e.
8There is no implicit claim that the below distributions have direct relevance to our problem.
They are simply common distributions (1 and 4 are Dirichlet distributions, 2 and 3 are uniform
distributions of two dierent sorts) exhibiting a variety of concentration patterns. We're calling
attention to the dependence of Quick Doom's posterior credence on the pattern of concentration.
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3. Let g(x) = k(ln(1   x)   lnx) for 0 < x  1
2
, g(x) = k(lnx   ln(1   x)) for
1
2
< x < 1, where k  1:386284. Then h(x)  g(x)
:0184138(1000 999x) , and
pE(D1) =
Z 1
0
xh(x) dx 
Z 1
0
xg(x)
:0184138(1000  999x) dx  :946642:
4. Let g(x) = 1

p
x(1 x) . Then h(x) =
10
p
10

p
x(1 x)(1000 999x) and
pE(D1) =
Z 1
0
xh(x) dx =
Z 1
0
10
p
10x

p
x(1  x)(1000  999x) dx  :969347:
Though all non-singular distributions favor Quick Doom to some degree, this
argument will never violate our intuitions by adopting a posterior credence outside
the convex hull of our prior support for the true probability of Quick Doom.9 As
to which distribution is apt, there is anecdotal evidence that Carter (1983) would
opt for one concentrated toward the extremes. To wit:
\...the very complicated mechanisms governing the evolution of living sys-
tems cannot yet be analysed, still less predicted, in other than very vague
qualitative terms. We certainly do not know enough to predict from rst
principles whether the expected average time t which would be intrinsi-
cally most likely for the evolution of a system of `intelligent observers', in
the form of a scientic civilization such as our own, should take much less
or much more time than is allowed by the external restraints that limit
the duration of favourable conditions. In such a state of ignorance, both
of these two alternative possibilities should therefore be retained for con-
sideration as not implausible a priori. Only the intermediate borderline
case, in which the intrinsically most likely evolution time came out to be
of just the same order as the time allowed by external restraints, could be
set aside in advance, as being much less plausible a priori..."
Reasoning similarly in the current case, one arrives at a posterior credence in
Later Doom of perhaps just a few percent, as in the latter two examples above.
4. Is Carter's argument sound?
Assuming that what I presented in the previous section really is Carter's argu-
ment, the question arises as to its soundness. There are grounds for believing the
argument to be sound. If one's anthropic reasoning is constrained by both fre-
quentism (e.g., the thirder response to Sleeping Beauty) and Bostrom's intuitions
about the Presumptuous Philosopher (forcing the \event/theory" distinction) one
would nd it dicult, in reasoning anthropically, to do other than respect Carter's
practice. We, for example, came to this conclusion prior to having read Carter;
this is just what appears to have been forced by the most plausible intuitions.
9As the expectation of ideal subjective probability, one's credences should never fall outside
the support of ideal subjective probability's distribution; Carter's anthropic principle teaches
that while selection eects may alter this distribution, they ought never to expand its support.
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Those who have resisted frequentist intuitions (David Lewis and the so-called
\double halfers") in anthropic reasoning have been derided mercilessly in the lit-
erature, and I shall do no piling on in these pages. What we'll consider instead
are two attempts by frequentists (thirders and double shifters, roughly) to oppose
the event/theory distinction. These arise in the context of Bostrom's Presump-
tuous Philosopher thought experiment. Recall that, in this experiment, we are
asked to imagine that there are two (and only two) competing \theories of every-
thing", namely T1, on which there will be an expected trillion trillion observers
in the cosmos, and T2, on which there will be an expected trillion trillion trillion
observers in the cosmos. It would be presumptuous (says Bostrom) to say that
T2 is overwhelmingly likely to be the true theory solely on the basis of anthropic
reasoning favoring theories that give rise to greater populations.10
Kenneth Olum, like others employing the double shift, is encouraged that \treat-
ing possible observers in the same way as those who actually exist" skirtsDooms-
day. And, he is willing to follow the presumptuous philosopher in thinking of
observers under an incorrect theory as \possible".11 So accepting Bostrom's pri-
ors in the thought experiment, Olum bites the bullet and concedes that posterior
probability in T1 ought to be miniscule. However, Olum seeks to avoid any em-
barrassment from this practice by holding that Bostrom's priors are unrealistic:
...it is possible that one should think that a theory involving a very large
universe is unlikely in proportion to the size of the universe it proposes.
In this case, the presumptuous philosopher is wrong, because the tiny a
priori probability for the theory with the larger universe cancels out its
larger number of observers.
Note that Olum's position suers if his epistemic distribution over the number of
observers is innite. For if we replace T2 by the union T3 of theories on which
\the number of expected observers is at least a trillion trillion trillion" and one's
prior distribution assigns T3 any positive probability and the expected number
of observers is innite, Olum's posterior assigns T3 probability 1.
The idea of a nite expectation distribution has some attractiveness, but ulti-
mately I don't see how, conditional on the universe (i.e. \everything") being
nite, one might reasonably assign even a countably additive distribution to the
number of observers, much less one having nite expectation. I don't see how,
in particular, that there could be an N such that one had 99.9999999999% con-
dence that there would be at most N observers, given that every N is miniscule
relative to many presumably reasonable possibilities for the expected number of
observers in a \vast" universe.12 So I doubt Olum is on the right track here.
10Note however that Bostrom too fails to pick up on the event/theory distinction, writing
(Bostrom 2002) \It is hard to see what the relevant dierence is between this case and [fair
coin-based balls-and-urns experiments]."
11Carter would likely disagee (for the relevant sense of \possible). A \theory of everything",
on this view, is not a matter of contingency. If you think it is, this attitude says you are
giving \everything" too narrow a scope...it should encompass what you are now thinking of as
counterfactual universes, if the theory deems that these might have been actual.
12Anyone who believes that the universe might be nite of course faces other hard questions.
How would it bootstrap itself into existence? And if it did so once, what would stop it from doing
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Another way to deny the force of the Bostrom's thought experiment is to grant
that the presumptuous philosopher is right to make the shift that he does in
favor of greater populations, but then neglects a second shift...a \Doomsday"
type shift...back in favor of the less populous scenario. Bostrom had explicitly
denied this move in his (2002):
So why cannot DA be applied in The Presumptuous Philosopher to cancel
the SIA-induced probability shift in favour of T2? The answer is that
in the absence of knowledge about our absolute birth ranks, DA works
by giving us information about what fraction of all species are short-
lasting. (That we should be at an \early" stage in our species is more
likely, according to the DA-reasoning, if a large fraction of all observers
nd themselves at such an early stage i.e., if long-lasting species are rare.)
This information about what fraction of all species are short-lasting (a
larger fraction than we had thought) in turn tells us something about our
own fate (that it is more likely that we are a short-lasting species). But
it does not tell us anything about how many species, and thus about how
many observers there are in total.
Bradley Monton (2003) took issue with the above passage from Bostrom, arguing
that you can, after all, run the Doomsday argument without knowledge of birth
rank. If so, it would allow double shifters to out the event/theory distinction and
apply self indication reasoning even with respect to theories (and so resist Carter's
argument). Monton writes \What is needed is a property p such that you know
you have p, and the total number of observers expected to have p would be the
same regardless of (whether T1 or T2 is true)." There are such properties. You
could, for example, use your life history to generate, in some canonical fashion, a
random number x uniformly distributed on the set f1; 2; : : : ; 1012g. You now let
p be the property \Either I live in a T1 universe or I live in a T2 universe and
my life history generates x." You know yourself to possess p, and the expected
number of observers possessing p is a trillion trillion on either theory.
But this property clearly won't do the job, because you also know yourself to
possess the stronger property \I live in a T1 or T2 universe, and my life history
generates x." Monton requires that you should necessarily know that the strongest
property p you know yourself to possess should be instantiated equally frequently
(in expectation) on each theory; but this is (mathematically) impossible, because
if we let Ei(p
) be the expected number of observers for whom p is their strongest
known property conditional on Ti, then
P
p Ei(p
) = 1012+12i. It follows that
the expected number of persons having a strongest known property p for which
E1(p
) = E2(p) is at most 1024. So if T2 is the correct theory and you are an
observer selected uniformly at random, the probability that your particular p
satises E1(p
) = E2(p) is at most one in a trillion. So Monton's argument fails.
so again? Maybe it should come as a surprise that there's anything at all, but given that there
obvious is something, the most natural thought is that there's just everything, innitely often,
and the correct theory of the whole mess is just that which ascribes to each nite constellation
of \somethings" the almost sure asymptotic frequency of its instantiations.
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5. Even Doomsday presentors think the true argument is safer
It's clear that others have unboxed Carter's argument in the manner of Section
3. Lewis (2001), for example, formulated rather precisely the model of anthropic
reasoning on which that argument rests. What's perhaps more surprising is that
there is textual evidence that both Leslie and Bostrom essentially (when push
comes to shove) think of the Doomsday argument in the manner of Section 3 as
well. One therefore wonders why balls-and-urns versions have survived at all.13
In this section we'll observe how Leslie and Bostrom, when pushing back against
the double shift, often retreat to safer positions more in line with Carter's prac-
tices. The most prominent instance we've seen (the Presumptuous Philosopher,
where Bostrom makes population size a matter of theory rather than chance).
Here's a more explicit case from (2002, p. 114), where Bostrom has just nished
acknowledging that the Dieks double shift is sound in a case where we can be
certain that there are equal, large numbers of large and small actual populations:
It is worth emphasizing, however, that suspecting that there are extrater-
restrial civilizations does not damage DA if we don't have any information
about what fraction of these alien species are \small". What DA would
do in this case (if the argument were sound in other respects) is give us
reason to think that the fraction of small intelligent species is greater than
was previously held on ordinary empirical grounds.
What Bostrom is talking about is conrmation, by low birth rank, of theories on
which greater fractions of intelligent species are small, i.e. Carter's true argument.
But since in realistic cases we obviously do have an absence of knowledge about
our absolute birth ranks, it seems that this just is the Doomsday argument.
Next we see how Leslie (1992) responds to the double shift threat to Doomsday:
(Dieks) believes that Carter's argument commits a dreadful error: it for-
gets that there would be enormously many more humans making their
observations if the human race lasted for enormously long. (...) If his
argument works then it delivers the curious result that we should be not
in the slightest inuenced by nding ourselves in the 1990s. For a human
to nd himself or herself there would be not particularly improbable on
the hypothesis of Quick Doom; it could be very, very improbable on the
hypothesis of Doom Deferred; and yet, says Dieks, this is absolutely noth-
ing in favour of the one hypothesis rather than the other. But is this not
too like arguing that nding oneself bitten by a dog gives one absolutely
no evidence for the hypothesis that the dog habitually bites?
Recall our explanation (at the beginning of Section 3) of how seeing a coin land
heads aects one's credences in various hypotheses (theories) as to the coin's
tendency to so land. Analogously, seeing Leslie's dog bite aects one's credences
in various hypotheses as to the dog's tendency to so act. It isn't chance events or
13As recently as March 2019 Bostrom presented the balls-and-urns version of Doomsday on a
podcast (1:14 of https://samharris.org/podcasts/151-will-destroy-future/){whilst stressing that
he does not endorse the argument. The true argument can be endorsed without embarrassment.
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any other ineliminably non-indexical assertions that receive direct conrmation
(such events may receive indirect conrmation transmitted through the theories,
as we described in the case of the coin) here but hypotheses (\theories") about
the long-run frequency of biting incidents in that particular dog's encounters with
humans. So this appeal to the dog's biting habits is a subtle retreat to Carter's
original principles{a retreat that gets far less subtle in the very next paragraph.
Consider L.S. Marochnik's theory that in our galaxy it is only in a narrow
band that planets have a reasonable chance of forming, and observers of
evolving. (The band is at a distance from the galactic centre at which a
density wave moves at roughly the same speed as the stars.) Our actually
nding ourselves inside this band should surely count as some evidence in
favour of such a theory.... Yet Dieks's reasoning suggests that if observers
were instead to be found throughout the galaxy, then the correspondingly
richer opportunities of nding oneself in the galaxy would exactly compen-
sate for the lesser chance of nding oneself in the band in question.
That the double shift doesn't apply here is straight up Carter. For obviously
Marochnik's hypothesis isn't only about our galaxy. In fact the double-shift rea-
soning would be appropriate if we were split on whether Marochnik's hypothesis
was true of our galaxy because we were convinced that half of all galaxies are
\Marochnik galaxies" and the other half were teeming with Earth-like planets.
(In such a case, we should think, prior to conducting the measurement showing
our own position, that we were more likely to be in a galaxy teeming with Earth-
like planets.) But Marochnik's hypothesis isn't of that nature. It's what we've
been calling a theory; so if we're split on whether it holds true of our galaxy, that's
because we're split on whether it's true of all galaxies, or false of all galaxies.
Some of the most interesting sections of Leslie (1996) are sections in which the
double shift is essentially capitulated to. In the following passage Leslie pins the
blame for such capitulation on \radical indeterminism":
There is always a rm fact of the matter...whether or not we know it,
of how many names there actually are in any given urn. But the world
may be...a radically indeterministic world in which there isn't yet any
relevantly similar fact of how long the human race is going to last. However
the doomsday argument does need such a fact in order to run smoothly.
(...) Still, it only reduces the power of the Doomsday argument instead of
destroying it. (...) If our world were indeterministic, there could well be
no usable fact of how long the human race will last. Urn analogies might
therefore work only rather poorly. (...) Even so, the doomsday argument
would retain considerable force...
Leslie is speaking, unmistakably if elliptically, about running Carter's true argu-
ment in a case where a balls-and-urns version fails to \run smoothly" owing to
\radical indeterminism" in the process by which the urn is selected. What we
would say here is that Leslie is on the right track, but conates deterministically
true with necessarily true. Determinism says that everything follows from the
initial conditions...it doesn't say that initial conditions aren't contingent, and the
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eect Leslie is noting here is no dierent if all of the contingency is packed in-
to the initial conditions. Carter's principles require competing theories that are
necessarily true where they are true and necessarily false where they are false...it
isn't sucient that they be deterministically true where they are true and de-
terministically false where they are false. These hypotheses must be such that
their truth values remain constant over counterfactual cases. This is true of deter-
ministic propositions so long as one xes initial conditions across counterfactual
cases, but there aren't any grounds for xing initial conditions across counterfac-
tual cases. If the universe is deterministic and nite but its initial conditions are
contingent (subject to probabilistic description, even), Carter's principles admit
counterfactual agents inhabiting universes with dierent initial conditions (but
no counterfactual agents inhabiting universes operating under dierent theories)
\into the reference class". (And if the universe is innite, one may dispense with
the encumbrance of counterfactuals entirely, since the space of actual counterparts
is suciently rich and has the right statistics almost surely.)
And one mustn't forget the \competing" aspect in \competing theories". In order
for Carter's true argument to induce a shift toward more likely early doom, there
has to be uncertainty as to the correct theory, and in particular as to the ideal
epistemic chance of early doom. Models involving dice that are known to be fair
won't exhibit this eect, so it's important to raise the possibility of loadedness
in any Doomsday-supporting experiment with dice. (The double shift applies in
models with fair dice.) Leslie (1996, p. 244) does so in the following passage:
You nd yourself in a room crammed with as many humans as will have
been born in the real world before AD 2150. (...) Although impressive
in size, the room is tiny by comparison with a second room, a room large
enough to contain ninety thousand times more people. Its ever actually
containing them was to depend on God's throw of two [radically inde-
terministic] dice.... Just if the dice fell appropriately [not double six],
God would create all those hugely many other people too. (...) Sup-
pose...further...that you've strong reasons to suspect the dice were loaded
(which nicely reects our frequent sense of insecurity when estimating
probabilities) (...) It's in the small room that you actually nd yourself,
however. All things considered, therefore, it would seem that God's dice
had probably landed [double six]"
Leslie stresses that the argument depends crucially on the loadedness of the dice:
Once again you nd yourself in the small room. (...) Let's specify, just
as before that God's dice are radically indeterministic. (...) Let's say you
know this, adding that you even know for sure that the dice are utterly
fair, unloaded. (...) Can nding yourself in the small room give you any
grounds for picturing the dice as landing double-six? The answer is that it
cannot. The dice are fair.... The probability that they will land double-six
is therefore exactly one in thirty-six. (...) Does this destroy the doomsday
argument? Unfortunately it only weakens it. In the world as it actually
is, we could have no assurance that the probability that the human race
would survive for this or that number of years was precisely such and such.
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So in this passage Leslie explicitly capitulates to the double shift when one knows
the true chances, at least when one also has \radical indeterminism...but, again,
I would say{as would Bostrom (see footnote 9 on p. 108 of Bostrom 2002){that
Leslie is mistaken to think that anything turns on this feature. He then falls back
on Carter's true argument in a case where one doesn't know the true chances.
It seems clear, then, that the double shift is a formidable enough obstacle for
Doomsday that its leading popularizers invariably retreat from it to the well
trodden ground of Carter's principles. The best explanation for this is the obvious
one. Namely, that while there are obvious and probably fatal problems with the
balls-and-urns versions, Carter's true argument remains \alive and kicking".
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